Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutComments Miscellaneous 6/3/2008 (2) i '. Troubled Bridges Over Water Comments on the 1-5 Willamette River Bridge Environmental Assessment February 19, 20Q8 prepared by: Mark Robinowitz www.Road-Scholar~org Peak Traffic: Planning NAFTA Superhighways at the End of the Age of Oil www.GreenwashEugene.com Green Eugene or Greenwash? Steps toward sincere sustainability No Build Alternative is a "Low Build" option 2 Should have built it once, not twice 2 Factor in Peak Oil to traffic modeling 3 ' most cost effective alternative should be selected 3 Peak Traffic and highway plans 3 Indirect and Cumulative Effects of Six Lanes 4 Why "replacements for oil" do not change Peak Traffic 5 55 mph needed 6 Air Quality , 7 ' Toxic Cement 7 Section 4(f) prohibits "use" 01 park land if there is a "prudent and feasible" alternative 6 Public Input ignored 9 Sustain A Bull 9 different designs for a new, wider bridge: 10 Trains need to be prioritized by ODOT 10 Comments submitted to the EA Scoping Meetings 11 1-5/ Franklin interchange proposal is not practical 14 ODOT = Oregon Department of Bridge Repair 14' Troubled Bridges Over Water: the 1-5 bridge crisis 14 Los Angeles: Bridges Remain Key Quake Risk 16 1-5 Bridge project needs to look at dangerous dams 18 The Willamette Valley Tsunami: Dam Collapses from Flood or Earthquake 20 . Eugene's Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 26 Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ " \ Most people do not enjoy having their entire worldview discredited; it sets them uncomfortably adrift. Scientists are no exception, A paradigm tends to be so greatly cherished that, as new knowledge or evidence turns up that contradicts it or calls it into question, the paradigm is embroidered with qualifications and exceptions, along with labored pseudo-explanations-~ anything, no matter how intellectually disreputable or craven, to avoid losing the paradigm. If a paradigm is truly obsolete, it must finally give way, discredited by the testing of the real world, But outworn paradigms ordinarily stand staunchly until somebody within the field makes a leap of insight, imagination, and courage sufficient to dislodge the obsolete paradigm and replace it, ' -- Jane Jacobs, "Dark Age Ahead" No Build Alternative is a "Low Build" option The No Build Alternative would include demolishing the decommissioned bridges and upgrading the detour bridges to meet current earthquake standards. It is estimated that upgrades to the detour bridges would cost $10 million to $15 million, not including demolition of the decommissioned bridges and other related costs. EA, p. 3 I strongly support the No Build Alternative to ensure the existing detour bridge can remain in use for decades (ie. through the rest of the oil era). No bridge, even a so-called temporary bridge, should be allowed to be constructed in western Oregon if it is not strengthened'for the extreme potential seismic risks of the Cascadia Subduction Zone. While there is not a public relations effort from the State government to warn people, especially new immigrants to Oregon, about the dangers of a Richter 9 earthquake off the Oregon coast, the State leadership is aware of the full risks to the region and should prohibit any use of state fu'nds to build critical infrastructure such as Interstate highway bridges that are deliberately not designed to withstand seismic energy. Should have built it once, not twice All traffic is now using the temporary detour bridge built in 2004. The detour bridge does not meet current earthquake standards and the construction methods used to build the bridge only meet environmental requirements as they apply to temporary, not permanent, bridges. p. 13 ' When it was determined that the original 1-5 bridge was cracked and deteriorating at dangerous levels, the original proposal to do a seismic safety upgrade to the b~'PfInec' d abandoned. It was astounding that ODOT and FHWA did not decide to replac~~ naiVe 2 JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ bridge only one ti,me, instead of twice. While several staff from these agencies have patiently explain~d the various regulations that they thou'ght forced them to make this choice, as energy costs increase and energy availability decreases, wasting non' ' renewable resources on rebuilding the same bridges over'and over will become more difficult. The highway construction lobby will still make money fixing broken bridges, and our money (and the oil and steel and concrete) would be better invested on repairing all of the faulty structures instead of repeatedly:fixing some of the bridges more than once.' While some will think this is outside the scope of this EA and therefore moot, if points to the need for a policy review of the way Oregon's bridge , replacement program is being run. without any consideration of the arrival of Peak Oil. Factor in Fleak Oil to traffic modeling The main point of these comments is that "Peak Traffic" caused by Peak Oil means there is no need to widen 1-5 through the study area (future traffic increases are not " likely given increasing fuel prices and decreasing fuel availability). Widening this section of Interstate 5 risks violating Federal Highway Administration policies and regulations about "independent utility" that address segmentation of large projects, " Ii most cost effective alternative should be selected :1 OOOT doesn;t have funds to fix all broken bridges on the state highway system, so the 50% widening for WRB should be used to repair other cracked bridges instead. In future, as ~nergy prices continue to climb, the resources to repair the bridges will become less. THerefore, the No Build I Low Build alternative is the most cost effective and least energYI,consumptive means of meeting the purpose and need of having a bridge across the, river likely to withstand seismic shaking. . , , Peak Traffic and highway plans The article "p'eak Traffic: Planning NAFTA Superhighways at the End of the Age of Oil" arch,ived at www.road-scholar.org/peak-traffic.htmlhas been submitted separately. It details why Peak Oil needs to be included in traffic I! models for high~ay construction - since the traffic projections for the year 2031 (the design year for this. project) are unrealistic since by then the world will be on the downslope of Hubbert's curve. The National Environmental Policy Act (signed into law by Richard Nixon) states that environmental documents need to " ' factor in "new ' circumstances" that are relevant. The fact that we have reached Peak Oil (for conventional oil) and climate change isihappening faster than climatological models predicted suggests that these, physical limits need to be factored into this and all other transportation studies. The fact that these realities are being ignored suggests entrenched corruption from the construction ~~eceived and political cowardice are making these decisions on the public's behalf. , JUN 0 3 2008 3 Planner: BJ , The Oregon Transportation Commission has been briefed on some of the better information about Peak Oil. Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury has publicly confirmed what many in the oil industry know - we have reached Peak Oil. , Nevertheless, no politician seems interested in translating geological reality into efforts to scale back the appetite of the highwaymen for more roads and wider roads. It is also worth noting that despite lots of rhetoric about "sustain a bull" from . local and state politicians and bureaucrats, no road projects have been scaled back or canceled to help the region reach a reduction in fossil fuel combustion that is one of the causes of anthropogenic climate change. It is a dangerous , illusion to pretend that we can continue business as usual and solve the climate crisis simultaneously. Oregon needs to pick either continued exponential growth or ecological sanity based on finite limits to the Earth. Indirect and Cumulative Effects of Six Lanes The Build Alternative, by building a six lane bridge (instead of a replacement bridge) would, divert resources away from fixing other damaged bridges on the state highway network. The EA needs to study how merely replacing the damaged bridge with a new bridge that is designed for four lanes of traffic (plus an emergency shoulder) would allow more resources to be used to repair or replace other damaged bridges. 3. 7. 5.2. Build Alternative The Build Alternative would not result In indirect land use impacts. The Build Alternative would not, of itself, increase the capacity of 1-5 nor facilitate development in the project area. The new bridge would be part of the transportation system needed to support the planned growth. When considering past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions along with the Build Alternative, there would not be cumulative impacts for iand use in the project area. The cities of Eugene and Springfield plan for growth and development in the project area are consistent with existing plans and goals. The Build Alternative would require some plan amendments and approvals, but would not contribute to a,significant cumulative effect on land use. ' ' , It is not the purpose of the project to modernize 1-5. p. 19 Nevertheless, this stretch of 1-5 would be widened under the Build option, part of a larger effort to widen 1-5 throughout Lane County, which would have substantial financial impacts and possibly displace several businesses. These impacts need to,be included in the analysis of cumulative impact of building a six lane bridge. Implementation of the No Build Alternative also has the potential to spread invasive weeds and grasses through translocation of plants and/or, seeds from the project site to other project areas on construction equipmer]t or vehicles: In addition, disturbance associated with the project and vehicle and pedestrian use of the area may ailt.ln . dispersion of invasive species to areas of roadway construction. uate Received 39. 4 JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ Actually, this would be a greater problem for the Build alternative than the No Build alternative, since there would be far greater construction activities if a new six lane bridge were built during a four year period. The existing bridges will not meet future traffic demands. The current average daily traffic (ADT) on 1-5 In the project area is about 49,000 vehicles and is predicted to . increase to roughly 73,000 ADT by 2030. Both the existing and detour bridges have four travel lanes, two in each direction. Six travel lanes, three in each direction, will be needed to handle the predicted 2030 traffic volumes. Replacement bridges would be wide enough for three lanes in each direction but would be striped for two lanes in each direction to match the number of lanes currently on 1-5 in this area. p.13 As stated previously, predictions of future traffic demand are unrealistic given Peak Oil's impact on fuel availability and price, 3.12.5 Indirect and Cumulative Effects 3.12,5.2 Build Alternative The Build Alternative would have no indirect or cumulative effects. The Build Alternative would provide bridges that would be wide enough to carry three lanes in each direction, but would be striped for two lanes in each direction. Restriping of the bridges to three lanes in each direction would require the widening of 1-5 north and south of the br.idges, which would involve additional environmental analysis, and agency and publiC review. This expansion is discussed as a future project in the TransPlan but is not funded arid, therefore, not a reasonably foreseeable action. As such, the Build Alternative would not change the capacity of 1-5. Several construction projects on 1-5 in southern Lane County are being completed that show potential for future "ultimate lanes" on the highway (Creswell interchange, new overcrossing of 1-5 south of Creswell). Therefore, it is obvious that the County and ODOT are quietly piecemealing plans for widening of the interstate and a cumulative' EIS analysis is needed on the entire project. If ODOT'sposition is there are no plans to widen 1-5, then there is no need to plan a six lane bridge that would cost considerably more than merely replacing the existing bridge (albeit with a shoulder for safety). Why "replacements for oil" do not change Peak Traffic Some apologists for expanded highways suggest that as cheap oil winds down there will be "alternatives" magically appearing through unspecified processes, However, petroleum has the highest ratio of "Energy Return on Energy Invested," and no substitutes currently under discussion come close to replacing existing energy sources. Tar sands, shale oil, turning trees into biofuels, turning food into biofuels, turning agricultural wastes into biofuels, coal to liquids and similar proposals have their merits (and their problems), but none are going to be able.to replace the current level of oil consumption I combustion, Therefore, traffic projections for the design year of this project and all other highway projects need to factor in reasonable estimates of ~ ' decline that will impact traffic levels two decades in the fUture. While no one knuate Received JUN 0 3 2008 'Planner: BJ 5 precisely what the economic and transportation impacts will be from Peak Oil, it is obvious that the impacts will be massive. 55 mph needed The US could immediately reduce oil consumption by an estimated 4% by rolling back highway speed limits to 55 mph (90 kph), a policy originally enacted by Richard Nixon in the wake of the 1973 Saudi Oil Embargo. This would reduce more oil consumption than the current flow through the Alaska Pipeline and would not require any technological innovations, merely psychological acceptance of the need for conservation. (statistic source: "Saving Oil in a Hurry: Oil Demand Restraint in . Transport," by International Energy Agency, Workshop: Managing Oil Demand in Transport, Paris, 7-8 March, 2005) US oil consumption - about 20 million barrels per day over 7 billion barrels per year 4% of 7 billion = 280 million Alaska pipeline flow in 2006:"277 million barrels (annual) www.oilempire.us/55mph.html The fact that this simple solution, which only requires new signs, not new technologies, is not considered politically realistic shows that addressing the energy and climate crises is not really a priority. If ODOT and the State of Oregon want to move toward "sustain ability" and address the Climate and Peak Oil crises, then implementation ofa 55 mph speed limit for Interstate 5 would be an easy way to address "low hanging fruit" forreducing energy consumption as we leave the era of cheap oil. r Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 6 Planner: BJ Percent reduction in total fuel use by lEA region, selected measures " ;r" 5% :6% ~<f' /" "," ~.. .,jT ~c.. ...'0'.: '1+0 ..J1 .p o~ <f4 ~;,. ~...e ...' ~?) 4' :-..~~ p~4, f;;)~ -f''' ...6 ~~ ,.a>' .. .;f' i<.~ ~ b' ;,,,,; ~..~. .~~t:J ~"'o. 4' "....(:0 ... .. '1Ilf'''i -, ,~..~... l~. :,.,f:'r, <( .'}' / v- ~~. .; ~<!> . ~~~ql;) ..... t,f.. ,~ .. ~ ~ ....:;",<:. ....~...0 ~# ./' ~'O... . ~?)I ....<:Ie 0" e'''; ,,-0 ~ .. 'lb~ q,"o~ ,Imp-erial.cqiiege' "London -. ,from www.iea.org/textbase/work/workshopdetail.asp?id=210 Saving Oil in a Hurry: 011 Demand Restraint in Transport Workshop on Managing Oil Demand In Transport (2005) Workshop: Managing oil demand in transport. by lEA - International Energy Agency European Conference of Ministers of Transport WORKSHOP: MANAGING Oil DEMAND IN TRANSPORT, Paris, 7-8 March, 2005 Air Quality Air Quality Roadway construction activities can temporarily create dust and small amounts of other' pollutants. Heavy trucks and construction equipment powered by gasoline and diesel engines would generate exhaust emissions. These effects would be reduced by following applicable state regulations. The project would not result in long term air quality impacts. Widening 1-5 to facilitate an increase in traffic is intended to facilitate more travel and therefore would contribute ,to an increase in combustion of fossil fuels. Toxic Cement Hazardous Materials Several sites with known environmental contamination are 7 Date Received JUN 0 ~ 700B ;r".,. ..-' '''' ";i!J ."."::::;,...-,t.,,,,\ i:"",) H '1!;',M IU 11;:;", "=' present within the project area. Demolition and excavation activities could affect two of the areas of concern that hav~ been identified. No long term effects on hazardous materials sites are anticipated. The EA needs to include the cumulative impact of using cement and concrete. that was made with incinerated hazardous wastes, if this is the fuel used to produce this material. The EA also needs to include the full impact of mining ores and gravels to produce the raw material for the new, larger bridge, as well as the environmental and toxic impacts of the paint, bolts, girders, wire, lighting systems and all other components of the new, larger bridge (versus the No Build / Low Buil~ option). A detailed article about the problems of toxic cement ,is archived at www.oilempire.us/cement.html and was submitted separately for consideration. Section 4(f) prohibits "use" of park land if there is a "prudent and feasible" alternative land Use (including Sections 4(f) and 6(f)) Alton Baker Park, which includes the Whilamut Natural Area and the Eastgate Woodlands, Is located on both sides of 1-5 in the project area. Adjacent land uses include transportation, industrial, residential, and open space uses. The project would not change existing land use in the project area. The project would need the following land use actions: Willamette Greenway (statewide planning goal #15) exception; amendments to Eugene-Springfield Metropolitan Area Plan and the Willakenzie Area Plan; and land development permits The "prudent and feasible" alternative is to select the No Build (Low Build" alternative. The No Build alternative would have much less impact on the park h:inds (both direct impact and in terms of duration) so it comes .<:;Iosest to the requirement for mitigalion. Four years of proposed construction in the park is not a "de minimus" impact on the park. , . The project would not have more than a de minimis9impact on the area; or There is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land; and p.~ ' The "no action" alternative - to strengthen the allegedly temporary bridge - would have much less damage (fewer years) to the 4(f) resources and therefore needs to be implemented as the prudent and feasible option. The temporary occupancy would not result in permanent physical effects on tOatsofleceived resource, p. 65 JUN 0 3 2008 8 Planner: BJ Putting heavy equipment, construction materials, gravel, etc. on natural soils results in compaction and other ecological damage that can take decades to reverse. The construction would cause essentially permanent damage to the park, and would also have "constructive use" impacts on the park. Therefore; minimizing the time of construction via the No Build alternative is mandatory. Even building a new four lane bridge (versus a six lane bridge) would reduce the construction time over a six lane expansion, Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (LWCF) grant money may have been used in the development of the park. The EA needs to state whether LWCF funds were used or not. The 1-5 Willamette River Bridge project is the largest project - both in terms of cost and the size of the bridges -- in the $1.3 billion OTIA III program. The scale of these bridges suggests the No Build (Low Build) Alternative needs to be adopted to free up funds to repair or replace other defective structures in the State highway system. Public Input ignored Public Open Houses Seventy people attended the meetings and submitted 36 comments on the proposed.action that were recorded on comment cards and flip charts. (EA) The comments that were submitted for ODOT to factor Peak Oil and climate change into the traffic projections were completely ignored in the EA, even though some of the staff privately admitted these concerns have merit. Sustain A Bull Sustainable design essentially means taking a long-term view. It is defined as using, developing, and protecting resources at a rate and in a ma,nner that allows people to meet their needs today, while ensuring that future generations can meet their own needs (OBDP, 2007b). Sustainability also includes reuse and recycling of materials from the removal 'of the decommissioned and detour bridges. ' 30 9 Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ ~ - I~ Sustainability really means zero use of fossil fuels and zero use of mined mineral ores. Reusing some of the structural supports of the old'bridge(s) is probably a good thing, but it is not a "sustainable" activity that could be continued after the oil is gone. Details about genuine sustainability related to transportation planning are posted at www.road-scholar.org/peak-traffic.html(sentseparatelyforthecommentperiod).A 100 mile per gallon (42 kilometers per liter) car is efficient, but not "sustainable." , different designs for a new, wider bridge: If a new bridge is built next to the allegedly temporary bypass bridge, it should be the design that would be strongest to resist the Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and the potential for damn failure on the Middle Fork and the damns upstream from Cottage Grove (the latter were not designed with any seismic safety criteria, according to the City o/Eugene). Wetlands temporarily affected during construction would be restored to pre-construction conditions following the completion of work. p. 98 It is unlikely that compacted soils would be quickly re6enerated with their full range of microbial and mycological diversity. The EA needs to include scientific analysis of how diverting park land to construction use for a period of years has allegedly resulted in full recovery of the original soils - and if this information is not available, then the "use" of the park land for construction must be considered a permanent "use" of the 4(f) resource. Trains need to be prioritized by OOOT I realize that "highway modernization" money cannot be diverted to upgrading the railroads of Oregon (and that there isn't excess highway construction money that could be diverted, anyway). Nevertheless, as Peak Oil becomes harder to deny, it would be nice for ODOT to. upgrade the priority for'railroad infrastructure while we still have at least some rail connections to other parts of North America. , The Federal Department of Transportation has plans for high speed rail between Eugene and Vancouver, B.C., but they aren't going anywhere. " Washington State is making some modest efforts to r~align curves (and making a short cut near Tacoma) to speed up the Amtrak Cascades service. The Washington DOT website has some details about these projects, but'none of them are upgrades for bullet train type service. If the State of Oregon is doing anything for trains, it's hard to notice. Oregon's gov~rnment is.too busy t~lking about Sustain a Bull to bother with such d19~ Received making the trains run on time.' ' In the past half year: JUN 0 3 2008 10 Planner: ~BJ . the train line to Coos Bay via Mapleton has been closed (lack of maintenance) . the short line to Tillamook washed out in the December 2007 storm, probably closing the line forever . the main UP line near Oakridge was wrecked by a US Forest Service clearcut . the tracks between Ashland OR and Weed CA are possibly going to be closed, too: The "Tal go" train between Eugene and Seattle can go about 200 kph (120 mph) but that's not quite bullet train performance. However, the train tracks are not capable of, handling this speed, and train service is slower than driving Interstate 5 at the speed limit (or even at the more efficient 55 mph / 90 kph limit imposed by Nixon to conserve some oil). As far as I know, no governmental authority has been planned for fast trains in Cascadia. ' The Oregon environmental groups don't seem interested in this. Perhaps if their funders (foundations) decide to prioritize train service then there could be more interest. Upgrading the train tracks from Eugene to Portland would require a couple hundred million (new rail? grade separated crossings for roads). '. ODOT has a report on their website about the need for extra freight rail lines around Portland to cope with train congestion (mostly caused by importing huge amounts of crap from Chinese sweatshops), The price tag would be $169 million - curiously the same price as one of the many versions of the West Eugene Porkway. The only noise I've seen (letters to the R-G) about better trains around Eugene seem more focused on having a passenger train to Mapleton (and then a shuttle bus to Florence? proposals are vague) although the train track between Mapleton and Veneta is very winding and no train could possibly go at a decent speed due to its condition - intercity bus service between Eugene and Florence is much more practical, although not as sexy. (The train line also does not go to Florence, and it is unlikely that a spur would ever be built there to haul tourists or gamblers at the casino~). Focusing on upgrading Amtrak is more urgent than a train to almost nowhere (no offense to anyone in Mapleton, but it's not a realistic destination for a passenger train line). In California, the High Speed Rail Authority seems more interested in planning their project (SF - LA) for another decade or two, not actually building anything. It's the transportation equivalent of "vaporware" (software that is promised for a long time but is never completed). . ' The Wall Street Journal had an article a couple days ago about the revival of freight rail in the US, but in Oregon we will be lucky the way things are deteriorating to have any train service at all. . Wall Street Journal - New Era Dawns for Rail Building: Lines Add Tracks, Upgrade Tunnels To Take On Trucks, By DANIEL MACHALABA February 13, 2008; Page A1 Comments submitted to the EA Seoping Meetings Interstate 5 Willamette River Bridge replacement Date Received ODOT held a public "Open House" on Wednesday April 5, 2006 for the 1-5 Willamette River Bridge project: JUN '0 3 2008 11 Planner: BJ / 11 :30 am - 2 pm Springfield City Hall Library Meeting Room 3 pm -7 pm Eugene Library meeting room OOOTis planning to spend $114 million to rebuild the 1-5 bridge over the Willamette River in Glenwood. ' A few years ago, OOOT had planned to perform a seismic upgrade to this bridge to make it resistant to large earthquakes, but when engineers examined the structure, they realized it was cracked and a seismic upgrade would have been a waste of money. (One of them told me that they were glad it was not a flood year, since they were not confident of the bridge's continued strength.) The heaviest trucks were rerouted onto circuitous routes and OOOT scrambled to build a "temporary" parallel bridge (over $20 million) that is now in operation. Unfortunately, the new "temporary" bridge was not buill to withstand earthquakes, and now OOOT wants to build a SECONO replacement bridge on the alignment of the original bridge. Since money is no object to some transportation planners, they ignored suggestions that the first replacement bridge be a permanent structure, which would have been much cheaper and simpler. OOOT's web site on the new bridge project is http://www.oregon.gov/OOOT/HWY/REGION2/1-5WRB.shtml If you attend these forums or send comments to OOOT, please urge them to consider the projections of Peak Oil and climate change in their traffic projections for this project. The US Army Corps of Engineers has now admitted that Peak Oil probably happened in 2005, and the military is taking steps to ensure that its installations have renewable energy systems to guard against energy disruptions. Scoping issues for the 1-5 Willamette Bridge replacement project: OOOT should have replaced the cracked bridge once, not twice. The so-called temporary bridge could be permanent if energy rationing or economic downturn prevents a quick replacement of the bridge. The curvature of the "temporary" re-route of 1-5 north of the temporary bridge is more than adequate to meet Interstate design standards and is not a safety hazard. OOOT and FHWA should consider these alternatives in the upcoming Environmental Assessment: OOOT should examine the feasibility of upgrading the "temporary" bridge to be a permanent structure capable of being strong enough to withstand earthquakes. Since OOOT is retrofitting other Interstate highway bridges for seismic safety, it is reasonable to assume this solution is possible for the "temporary" bridge. If it is not feasible, this' , fact should be documented through independent peer review, not merely through . assertions. Whether upgrading the "temporary" bridge is feasible or not, OOOT and FHWA need to include the' reality of Peak Oil into the Purpose and Need for the project, and to include Peak Oil into the long term traffic 'projections used to justify any action taken in this effort..' , Peak Oil is a reality that the Oregon Secretary of State, numero'us members of ' Congress and even the United States Vice President and President have DateeReceived Much media attention has been focused on Peak Oil in recent years, and many JUN 0 3 2008 12 Planner: BJ ,- employees of ODOT and other transportation agencies privately admit that it is a real concern that needs to be addressed. While no one, not even the Vice President, knows precisely what will happen with Peak Oil, it is obvious that petroleum prices will increase sharply before the design years of 2025 and 2030. Perhaps ODOT could explore a range of scenarios: gasoline at $5 per gallon in 2025, gasoline at $50 per gallon in 2025, and gasoline not available to the public in 2025 (only to elites and the military). No prediction is likely to be accurate, but to pretend that gasoline prices and availability will remain constant is even more delusional than the expectations of. some that old growth forests could be liquidated forever without economic and ecological consequences: Since the proposed replacement bridge is planned to be an eight lane span, L formally request the inclusion of a "Twin Span, Staggered Construction" alternative in the Environmental Assessment. Part of the problem with the single span structure over the river was that it was not possible to repair one direction of travel at a tim~. A twin span structure would avoid this problem. Staggering the construction - building a four lane structure (either an upgrade to the existing temporary bridge or construction of a new bridge on the original alignment) would allow for future completion of the ultimate eight lane design if money becomes available for the future widening of 1-5 north and south of the bridge. Since we are near or at Peak Oil, that funding is likely not to be available, and therefore postponing the second phase of the project until it is available is prudent and feasible. I also strongly recommend that the entire construction be performed within the existing footprint currently occupied by the road (without any new impacts to the park) and that any new bridge have a suspension design to avoid new structures being placed into the riverbed. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any new or upgraded bridge depends on the seismic upgrades to upstream dams on the Coast Fork, Row River, Middle Fork and Fall Creek, since none of them are currently strong enough to withstand the next Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake. Money planned on much wider highways to carry traffic afterPeak Oil would be better spent on upgrading the dangerous dams before an earthquake creates the "Willamette Valley tsunami." Seismic safety needed Many Oregon bridges need seismic retrofits to ensure that the region's transportation system could function after a modest earthquake - which should be a much higher priority than a new highway to serve speculative developers who want to expand the UGB. "Most bridges in the area have not been seismically retrofitted, creating significant risk to the commuting population from earthquakes," , Oregon's Regi,onal Natural Hazards Risk Assessment (regarding the southern Willamette Valley) http://csc.uoregon.edu/pdr_website/projects/state/snhra/snhra. htm Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 13 Planner: BJ r 1-5/ Franklin interchange proposal is not practical The "spaghetti bowl" of a potential 1-5, interchange would have major riverfront impacts, would cause residential displacements and disruption ,to neighborhoods, would be very expensive, and would be less than one mile to 1-105 interchange (improper spacing according to ODOT design standards). The money for the interchange would be better spent on seismic upgrades to the dangerous dams upstream from Glenwood. ' ODOT = Oregon Department of Bridge Repair The $5 billion in bridge repairs and replacements for 1-5 and 1-84 is only one-third funded. This is a violation of the Oregon Highway Plan,which places bypasses as the lowest priority level for funding. The OHP also prioritizes projects that have some local matching funds, and to the best of my knowledge, the City has offered as much money toward the WEP construction fund as I have (in other words - zero).There are about 200 seriously defective bridges on 1-5 and 1-84 that need urgent repair work - fixing this should be the primafy focus for ODOT. (It is the fault of the trucks and the "warehouse on wheels" of the Wal-Marts and Targets that get cheap distribution while we subsidize their profit, a situation made worse by NAFTA.)The WEP is a microcosm of this myopia, since it would demolish an existing bridge (126 over the RR tracks) to build a new bridge (WEP/126 at Terry St).The WEP would demolish a bridge on Highway 126 (a highway of "state importance") and build a replacement on the relocated 126 at Amazon Creek. Before ODOT builds new bridges, it should take care of the incredible backlog of defective bridges on the state highway system, which is already interfering with traffic and commerce in numerous areas of the state. Oregon already has the highest number of defective/cracked bridges of any west coast state (source: FHWA Oregon Division) and continuing the policy of building new roads when existing ones aren't being properly maintained could lead to severe problems with the existing road network. The Oregonian ran a three day series on this topic titled "Troubled Bridges" on . February 3 - 5, 2002. The title of the second day's report says it all, "Today's trucks . . strain yesterday's bridges: Engineers who ride herd on state's bridges are flabbergasted to find them developing dangerous cracks." Troubled Bridges Over Water: the 1-5 bridge crisis Register-Guard, February 28, 2003 1-5 bridge repairs must be regional priority By Mark Robinowitz THE INTERSTATE 5 bridge crisis requires shifts in regional transportation priorities. Fixing the freeway Is more important than the West Eugene Parkway, the Interstate 5-Belt.Line interchange expansion or the proposed River RoadNalley River Bridge. Money is limited, and the number of bridge construction companies Is finite. These facts require theBateoReceived choose whether to maintain 1-5 or build new roads that subsidize sprawl. 14 JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ r Until a few months ago, the Oregon Department of Transportation planned a saismic upgrade to the 1-5 bridge over the Willamette River. Upon closer examination, ODOT inspectors realized that the bridge is cracked and needs to be replaced. The closure of 1-5 through the metro area to heavy trucks is partially a consequence of local governments' quixotic quest for the West Eugene Parkway. If the parkway haq been dropped years ago (its 1990 approval was dropped after a 1996 federal lawsuit), ODOT might have focused its efforts - and our money - on repairing worn-out bridgeS. Instead, the region faces an economic crisis caused by years of neglected m~intenance and the Legislature's permitting of trucks heavier than the bridges were designed to handle. In January, Eugene Mayor Jim Torrey said at an ODOT hearing on regional highway priorities that "we do not do a good job in Oregon of preserving roads." Even though it is much more expensive to rebuild roads than to repair thenn, local governmentsl have promoted the. parkway, not adequate repairs of existing roads. . I In June 2001, due to legal and financial obstacles, ODOT promised to select a "no build" option for the West Eugene Parkway, and to fix existing r~ads in west Eugene: instead. The Eugene City Council refused to accept this, and put the parkway on the Nover;nber ballot, where voters split 51-49 for the highway. In 2002, Eugene': Springfield, Lane County and the Lane Transit District rewrote the regional highway budget to include most of the parkway - ignoring the urgent need to fix cracked bridges on the i[lterstate. Now, ODOT is seeking Federal HighiNay Administration approval for the parkway, ,despite huge legal and financial obstacles. . ' 1 The parkway'S official price tag of $88 million ignores inflation, the Belt Line-parkway interchange (recently rose from $17 million to $25 million): the future extensioh along Highway 126 across Fern Ridge Reservoir to Veneta ($13,: million) and a prob~ble parkway to 1-105 connector through the Whiteaker area. For comparison, a proposed fbur-mile ' bypass of Oregon 62, north of Medford, would cost $130 million - about twice the cost per mile as the six-mile parkway. ' 1 The parkway is a subsidy for development boondoggles, not a means to solve traffic jams. Indeed, ODOT traffic analyses predict that it would createJraffic snarls at Belt jLine and along Sixth and Seventh avenues. A reasonable alternative that IS cheaper and more effective than the freeway would include modest work on existing roads and iritersections, improved public transit, and land use shifts to focus new development into doWntown and abandoned industrial areas instead of on wetlands at the periphery. 1 A better "low-build" alternative also exists for the $100 million-plus expansion of the 1-5 and Belt ,Line interchange. ODOT already plans to separate southbound 1-5 traffic into local and .through lanes (like 1-5 northbound), which would reduce d'ilngerous weaving. Perhaps the most important shift would be to keep downtown Eugene and Springfield iNheie they are, and stop efforts to relocate the urban cores to Coburg Road and Gateway - intluding the proposed Peace Health complex in the McKenzie River floodplain. I' The recently revived proposal for a bridge from River Road to Valley River Center - through Rasor Park and the Willamelte Greenway - would be an even greater distraction to the need to keep 1-5 intact. I , . Oregon has more damaged bridges than any other Western state, and the billions to replace them are not in the budget. , ,':' 1 Gov. Ted Kulongoski has proposed raising vehicle registration fees to find some 01 the funds for fixing bridges. While car fees do not cover the true cost of driving and mairitaining the , road network, it is the trucKs that have caused the problem, and the trucks shbuld pay their fair share in solving it. "I Mark Robinowitz is a participant with WETLANDS: West Eugene Transportation, Land and Neighborhood Design Solutions ' Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 15 Planner: BJ ,- Los Angeles: Bridges Remain Key Quake Risk www.latimes.com/news/local/la- me- bridges 12mar 12,0,6500882,full.story?coll=la-home-local , Bridges Remain Key Quake Risk , Caltrans has upgraded most of its spans, but cities and countit..s are struggling to find funds to fix theirs.. Experts fear results are ybars away. By Sharon Bernstein, Times Staff Writer March 12, 2006 . Although the state has made great strides in protecting its,own bridges from earthquakes, hundreds of bridges maintained by cities and counties across California remai'n unfixed. A Times review of state and county records found that nearly 600 bridges andloverpasses that officials identified as being at the highest risk for collapse in a major temblor have yet to be reinforced. They Include several landmark spans in Los Angeles, such as the Hyperion bridge in Silver Lake and the Art Deco 6th Street bridge across the Los Angel~s River downtown. ' I Counties and cities have struggled to find the money for the retrofitting projects, which have had to compete -not always successfully - with more bread-and-butter projects like widening roads and fixing potholes. ' . I' "The cities have other priorities," said Pat DeChellis, deputy director of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works. "They could use those funds for lots of other transportation purposes." , ' I' The California Department of Transportation has done much better: Of the roughly 2,200 quake-vulnerable bridges maintained by the agency, all but 11 have been retrofitted. To achieve this, the state has spent $2.4 billion since 1989, when the Lorna Prieta earthquake collapsed an eleva!ed freeway in Oakland, killing 43 people. I' Local governments, however, complain that they don't have the financial resources for retrofitting, even though the spans they are responsible for carry thousands 01 commuters daily. "I . In the Southland, these include the La Cienega Boulevard bridge over Ballona Creek on the Westside, Avenue'26 over the Arroyo Seco, Imperial Highway over the San Gabriel River in Downey and Norwalk, Van Buren Boulevard over the Santa Ana River in Rivetside and a MacArthur Boulevard bridge at John Wayne Airport in Orange County. I The work is expensive: Fixing the 6th Street bridge alone would cost $140 million. In 2002, , ' the Legislature and then-Gov. Gray Davis eliminated a transportation fund that had been earmarked for the city and county bridge retrofits. Although federal money is ~Iso available for the program, Sacramento's decision meant local agenCies had to come up with matching funds on their own. ", ' Last year Congress moved to boost retrofitting efforts by r~ducing the level of 1m at ching funds required for all bridge projects from 20% to 11.47%,"citing concerns over the deteriorating state of the nation's bridges. As a result, the 'amount that local agencies will have to pay Is much less than it had been previously. I Some officials are eyeing Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's $222-billion public infrastructure bond proposal asa possible source of money. The Legisla,ture Is debating ho+ s~h 'i. . windfall would be used. The issue of bridge retrofitting is not specifically mentiJntllal9 Received governor's draft proposal, but some legislators are pushing it. 16 JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ ."...._, Even with help from the federal government, however, many local govern men s say they can't come up with the matching funds. At a time when traffic congestion is worse than ever, officials say it can be politically difficult to put seismic retrofitting ahead of road repair and improvements and mass tr~nsit lines. "It's an ongoing sore point for the last 10 years," said Stephen Maller, deputy direCtor of the California Transportation Commission. "These bridges have not been a top pri'ority for the local agencies.~' " . I After Loma Prieta, the state worked with local agencies to identify bridges in need of seismic upgrades. ' I John Koo, bridge group manager for L.A.'s Bureau of Engineering, said he spends "a good deal of time" trying to educate Metropolitan Transportation Authority officials and others who hold the purse strings to allocate more money for retrofitting. "I am concerned ,that MTA does not share the same higher priorities for seismic retrofitting:Of bridges as we do in the city of L.A.," he said. " I Koo said the city has 27 bridges identified by the state as most in need of seismic upgrades. But in the absence of funds from either the MTA or the state, he said, the city tannot pay for all the projects. I Local officials complain that even when money is secured; it can take years of studies and surmounting of regulatory hurdles to do the work. '. I , "We know what needs to be done," said Lloyd Dalton, design engineer for Newport Beach, which has four bridges yet to be retrofitted. "It's very frustrating." I In San Diego; efforts to fix several historic bridges have met with opposition from community groups that worry about aesthetics. The city governmenl is negotiating with nJighborhood groups over the fate of the Georgia Street bridge, an arched span built in 1914 for the Pan American Exposition. Many of the buildings in Balboa Park were also created for the expo. "The first time the engineers went out and told the community group about th~ bridge, they said it needed to come down," said Patti Boekamp, director of engineering and capital projects for San Diego. "The community became completely unglued." I ' Fred Turner, staff structural engineer for the California Seismic Safety Commission, said the risks to the economy as well as human life are too great to put off such work ~ny longer. "These are essential facilities that our economy rests on, "he said. "It's really Jnfortunate that we haven't found ways to retrofit them." Local governments aren't alone in their struggles to retrofit at-risk bridges. The state Department of Water Resources, which operates the California Aqueduct and owns 24 of the bridges, hopes to finish evaluating the spans this year, start d~signwork in , 2007 and complete construction by 2008, according to Principal Engineer Richard Sanchez. Sanchez said he does not know why it took the department so long to begin Iboking at the bridges but that he hopes to begin retrofitt'ing them by 2008. I The work is important, he said, because if one or more of the bridges collapsed in an ' . - 'c I earthquake, traffic would be snarled and debriS could fall into the water supply. But even with that effort underway, seismic experts fear that many high-risk bridges are years - or decades - away from being fixed. , ' I "We started these programs in 1989 with the Loma Prieta',earthquake, and then we had another wake-up call In 1994 with the Northrldge earthquake. And now, anoth~r [12] years later, it's still not done," said Frieder Seible, chairman of Caltrans' seismic safJty advisory board and dean of the engineering school at UC San DieQo. I, ' "Even jf it's one bridge that falls," he said, "it will be one too many - especially if it's you or me or our family on that bridge." * Bridges at risk . ,.., DatA Received Here are some spans that officials have concluded have the greatest risk of f~iling In The event of a major earthquake. JUN 0 3 2008 17 Planner: BJ Los Angeles County . Fletcher Drive at the Los Angeles River in Los Angeles I . La Cienega Boulevard at Ballona Creek in Los Angeles . Riverside Drive at the Tujunga Wash in Valley Village . Avenue 28 at the Arroyo Seco in Los Angeles . 6th Street at the Los Angeles River in Los Angeles . Hyperion Avenue at Glendale Boulevard and Riverside Drive In Los Angeles . Imperial Highway at the San Gabriel River on the Downey-Norwalk border Riverside County " . Van Buren Boulevard at the Santa Ana River in the Santa Ana River Wildlife Area . River Road at the Santa Ana River west of Norco Orange County . Park Avenue at Grand Canal in Newport Beach . Jamboree Road at San Diego Creek in Newport Beach '" . McFadden Avenue at the Santa Ana River in Santa Ana !I . Fairview Street at the Santa Ana River in Santa Ana ,Source: California Department of Transportation 1-5 Bridge project needs to look at dangerous dams , , "I In the event of a catastrophic earthquake, any of the six dams on the Willamette River upstream of the 1-5 Willamette River Bridge could fail. Due to the uncertainty of the ' number of potential failures, if any, no estimate on potential water volume in the project area can be given. p.45 The water surge from an earthquake induced dam collapse would have significant stress on the bridge and must be included in the EA analysis. See attached report from the City of Eugene on seismic risks to the upstream damns on the Middle Fork and above Cottage Grove. http://oilbeseeingyou. blogspot.com/2007 /07 /post -peak-dam -maintenance-or -lack.! tml Tuesday, July 31, 2007 Post Peak Dam Maintenance, or Lack Thereof "Dam failures are of particular concern because the failure of a large dam has the potential to cause more death and destruction than the failure of any other man-made ~tructure~ This is because of the destructive power of the flood wave that"would be released by the sudden collapse of a large dam."[2] What will be the fate of the wqrld's large dams after peak oil as energy declines, technology falters and budgets lor inspection and maintenan~e of these critical and dangerous facilities begin to be pared back in deference to percei\ ed more immediate societal priorities? , :;, Date Received 'JUN 032008 18 Planner: BJ , " I' . " www.csmonitor.com/2007 /0913/p02s0 l-usgn.l;1.tml PROBLEM DAMS ON THE RISE IN US Pennsylvania has seen a fivefold increase in deficient dams si lce 1999, By Mark Clayton I Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor from the September 13, 2007 edition The Kaloko dam in Hawaii stood 116 years - until last year when it collapsed lfter heavy rains, killing seven. Potential disaster was averted in April in Hollis, N.H., when a dozen families \ll.ere evacuated and engineers made a controlled breach of an old pond dam to keep it from f~i1ing . Such incidents are warning signs that many of the nation'~ more than 87,000 dams are in need of repair. Last month's high-profile collapse of the 1-35 bridge in Minneapolis focused America's attention on bridge problems. The nation's dams are worse off. . In 2005, the last time the American Society of Civil Engineers rated America's infrastructure, bridges received a "C" grade; dams earned a "D." Even that rating may be generous, a Monitor analysis of dam-inspection data shows. Since 1999, the number of "high-hazard" dams rated ,"deficient" has more than doubled, according , , to data from the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) in Lexington, Ky. High- hazard dams are those whose failures could cause fatalities. In 1999, the US had 546 such dams rated deficient. By last year, it had 1,333. I ' ' A second category of "significant-hazard" dams (so-called because they threa1en substantial property loss) saw a rise from 339 to 949 deficient dams Clver the same period. In all, 2,6 percent of the nation's dams are deficient, according to the ASDSO. ' I "The growth of deficient high-hazard dams in this country is a major issue," says Brad Larossi, legislative chairman for the ASDSO, which represents dam-safety inspectors in all states. "The trend is rising at such a steep slope, much faster than states can 'do [dam] , . rehabilitation. Without question the overall trends are clear." I Several factors are behind the rise. Old dams continue to deteriorate or may fail suddenly because of inadequate spillways and trees growing on dams. Many states dO~'t have enough dam engineers to keep up proper maintenance, causing the repair backlog to grow. And as more homes and businesses are built closer to dams, the hazards inclease, a phenomenon dam-safety experts call "hazard creep." '" I Some experts claim that some of the rise is due to better reporting, an encouraging sign. "To be frank, there's been in,the past a reluctance in some quarters 10 identify too!many dams as deficient," says Mark Ogden, administrator for dam-safety engineering at the Ohio Department of Natural Resources in Columbus. "But there's also been a stron'g effort by our association to increase awareness of this problem. We all,are realizing we need an honest assessment." ..' I' ' Some states are seeing a faster rise in deficient dams than others. Pennsylvania leads the pack with 215 deficient high-hazard dams, 172 more than ,in 1999. Not far behind is Ohio, with an increase of 158 . Other states, such as Colorado, New Jersey, and California have seen declines. Some of that is due to better funding, experts say. All three haVe boosted dam budgets by a third or more since 1999. I Those increases are in contrast to federal dam spending. The nation's dam-safety program, which helps fund safety inspector and engineer training, has not been fully fUhded in at/east five years, Mr. Larossi says. Actual funding is about $5.9 million, weil below th~ $9 million budgeted, he says.' Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 19 Planner: BJ I ~ - , : As a result, the number of full-time inspectors has not increased since 1997 (excluding Florida, which claims to have hired 45 insPl?ctors). That leaves each inspector responsible for about 195 dams on average; the ASDSO recommends' no more than 50. "We have seen increased awareness over the importance of adequate funding for state inspectors, but these offices are still understaffed," says Stephanie Lindloff, of American Rivers, an environmental group. www.greenwash.com/dam.html c The Willamette Valley Tsunami: Dam Collapses from Flood or Earthquake Perhaps the most serious disaster threat faced by the Eugene area is the potential for catastrophic failure of dams during a large flood or earthquake. The only disaster that would be worse is some sort of national or global cataClysm (nuclear war or pandemic), scenarios that would not be limited to our region. If a 40 foot wall of water swept through the Eugene - Springfield area, the aftermath would resemble a mix of the inundation zones from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the impact of Hurricane Katrina upon the City of New Orleans. If the dam failures would caused by a large earthquake, it is likely that this would be the end of the Eugene metropolitan region. The combination of bridge collapses, destruction of many buildings and the sudden, severe flood from the dam failures would make the area "resemble Hiroshima" -- as one City Councilor has privately expressed. At a minimum, emergency response and awareness of these threats are desperately needed. Inundation maps need to be made public so that citizens would know how far - and which directions - to flee in the event of disaster. The State of Oregon posts tsunami inundation maps for coastal communities on its website, and posts signs on Highway 101 to indicate the danger zones. There is no technical, legal, political, financial or security excuse to keep similar information secret from the taxpayers of Eugene,'Springfield and nearby communities -- since this knowledge would be the most important factor for minimizing casualties should this event occur. How far away from , the river people would have to go is unknown to the average person. Would vertical evacuation in downtown Eugene be sufficient (going to the top of a parking garage or one of the taller buildings)? Widespread awareness of these facts could spur regional and federal government actions to address the problems by either strengthening or removing the dangerous dams. Date Received JUN 0 3 2008 20 Planner: BJ .:- r- jt:~~f.~<:.:~~~~W.~:~;o,:,~~~,'.~'"' ~~''''''I'>&;.:.a,,, N;- .~~ ,~ ,""" ..{l;,'.,:~~ ",~,,~ ~:~~if::';;::::ti>:-_;::~.. , . ',-- ... > ~.' ", Hills Creek dam (photo from Army Corps of Engineers) The City of Eugene "multi hazard mitigation" discusses the dangers of nine dams -- Cottage Grove, Dexter, Fall Creek, Dorena, Lookout Poir'1t, Blue River, Hills Creek, Cougar, Fern Ridge. Three of them had no seismic considerations when built (Cottage Grove, Dorena, Fern Ridge). The others had some seis~ic concerns in the design, but that was before the threat of the Cascadia Subduction Zone was fully understood. A large Valley earthquake (Richter 77) or a Subduction Zone event off the coast (Richter 9) could breach some, if not all of the dams. :' According to the Multi-Hazard report, a failure of Lookout Point (upstream of Dexter) would require the evacuation of over 250,000 people with damages in , excess of $10 billion. Rep. De Fazio was asked about this September 19, 2005 at his town hall meeting, and he didn't want to deal with it. He just said that removing the dams was not practical (due to "developed" low lying areas) and refused to discuss the need to strengthen them. Lookout Point (the large dam just upstream from Dexter, visible from Highway 58) is the largest reservoir in the entire Willamette River system. It is also next toa (possibly inactive?) earthguake fault. '. n to. R . The report does not estimate the money that would be required to strerfgfa~o ecelved dismantle) these dangerous dams, but the price tag probably has lots of zeros in,~t., B.ut , ' 21 I ' JUN \I 3 2008 Planner: BJ r , the federal empire is too busy destroying other countries to worry about such matters (and Eugene didn't vote for the dictator anyway). One Trident submarine or a couple of days of the Iraq occupation would probably cover the full cost of the repairs, but Halliburton and Lockheed Martin would not be able to reap obscene profits, so there are no plans to fix them anytime soon. www.eugeneweekly.com/2005/12/15/news.html Back on Oct. 13 in this column we wrote about the nearly three dozen "high potential hazard" dams in Lane County, all but one upriver from Eugene and Springfield. Dam failure from a major earthquake could bring catastrophic flooding, This past week we got a delayed response from Randy Prince who has served on a state advisory committee looking at such risks. He tells us no seismic upgrades are happening to Oregon dams, and money is being diverted away from even evaluating these dams. "Inundation maps for a disaster are secret," he adds, and the secrecy is heightened since 9/1). He notes that geoiogy professor Ray Weldon at City Club estimated a major earthquake risk of 2 to 5 percent, but that "applies to each building in our area, not the chance of having an earthquake in bur area that causes damage. Poorly sited or under-designed facilities are the ones that will fail when the 100 percent certain big quake happens." Prince says he's worried about local hospitals building new facilities along rivers and within inundation zones. We share his concerns. . The enormous US dam problem no one is talking about By Gaylord Shaw Christian Science Monitor January 3, 2006 DUNCAN, OKLA. - The landscape of America, at last count, is dotted with 79,272 large dams. Most of them salely deliver bountiful benefits - trillions of gallons of water for drinking, irrigation, and industrial use, plus flood control, recreation, hydroelectric power, and navigation. That's the good news. Here, in my opinion, is the bad news: Disaster lurks in thousands of those dams. At least 3,500 of America's big dams are unsafe, according to inspection reports filed away in obscure nooks and crannies of government offices across the country. Thousands more dams also are unsafe, the American Society of Civil Engineers concluded this year, but no one knows for certain how many because few stateshave"the funds for even cursory safety inspections. Thus, every moment of every day, unsafe dams form a vast reservoir 01 danger throughout America. That's not an overstatement. I'm not a professional engineer, but I've spent nearly two-thirds of my' 45-year career in journalism studying unsafe dams. I've done on-the-scene reporting on dam failures that killed 175 people and caused billions of dollars in property damage. I've interviewed scores of victims, dozens of state and federal engineers, inspectors, and officials, and examined records on hundreds of dams. In my view, the cumulative hazard posed by unsafe dams is huge, but it remains largely unexplored by the media. When a dam fails - and records suggest dozens do each year, ~~~~~:ts usually are viewed as local, transitory incidents rather thana Symbot1af~imCeived Hurricane Katrina underscored the peril of depending on man-made structures for protection against disaster. Failure of the New Orleans' levee system during the storm this year JUN 0 3 2008 22 Planner: BJ r- '~,i contributed to prolonged flooding and 1,300 deaths. Months later, as scenes of misery and dislocation lingered in the public mind, President Bush urgently asked Congress to approve $3 billion for the Army Corps of Engineers to begin rebuilding New Orleans' battered levees. The House of Representatives included that amount ih a $29 billion hurricane recovery assistance package it passed three days later. In concept and construction, levees are close cousins of dams. But while politicians flocked to support repair of New Orleans' levees, they've virtually ignored a proposed Dam Rehabilitation and Repair Act which has languished for nearly a year in a House . subcommittee. The proposal would authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to disperse $350 million over four years to help states repair unsafe dams. Chances of Congress enacting such a repair program anytime soon are slim. The $350 million program would be a down payment of less than 10 percent toward the estimated $36.2 billion total cost of repairing America's un~afe dams. It also is approximately one-eighth of the amount the president is seeking for repair of the New Orleans' levees. , This is not to suggest that the New Orleans' levees go uniepaired. But from New England to Hawaii more and more aging dams are experiencing problems, with little public awareness. A few large and small examples: . Taunton, Mass., got national attention in October when a 173-year-old, 12-foot-tall wooden dam above its business district began to buckle. Stores ahd schools were closed for a week and townspeople headed for higher ground. The crisis eased when the water level behind the dam was lowered. The federal government is now paying 75 percent of the $189,410 cost of tearing down Whittenton Mills Dam and replacing it with a new one. . In the placid Schoharie River Valley 0.1 upstate New York, a volunteer group calling itself Dam Concerned Citizens was formed last month to press for emergency repairs to 182-foot- tall Gilboa Dam, built 80 years ago to supply drinking water to New York City. The dam has been leaking for years. Now citizens have established their own website which distributes emergency notification plans and publicizes preselected evacuation routes for use should the dam fail (www.gilboadaminfo.com). . Residents of Denver, Colo., population 2 million plus, were warned last month by Hie Corps of Engineers that serious safety problems have been detected at Cherry Creek Dam, a 141- foot-tall earthen structure. The dam was built 55 years ago on what was then windswept pastureland 10 miles south of Denver. Now the dam looms above Interstate 225, a cluster of office parks and swank homes, a nationally known golf course, and several schools. Bruce Tschantz, professor emeritus at the University of Tennessee who 25 years ago helped establish the first Office of Dam Safety in the then-nascent FEMA, reached back into classical mythology to fetch a phrase - "the sword of Damocles" - to express his concern about the dangers posed by deficient dams perched above developed areas. (Damocles, was a courtier at the court of Dionysius I in the 4th century BC. He was so gushing in his praise of the power and happiness of Dionysius that the tyrant, to illustrate the pre'cariousness of rank and power, gave a banquet and had a sword suspended above the head of Damocles by a single hair.) "We know what the problems are, we know where they are, and we know how to fix them," Dr. Tschantz said in a telephone interview. It's that next step - actually getting the money to fix them - where we're stalled." Tschantz doesn't point fingers of blame. But it's clear to me that Congress and several presidents, including the current occupant of the White House, share culpability on the nationalleyel, and that too many state and local officials have grown weary onrying to find sources of financing to make dams safer. Jimmy Carter was the last president to display serious and sustained interest in the issue. He had been in office less than a year when, in the eariy morning darkness of a ~d\lY. in . November 1977, a never-inspected dam in the mountains of his home state of Gw-a<le ReceIved collapsed and sent a wall of water crashing down upon the campus of Toccoa Falls Bible JUN 0 3 2008 23 P'anner~ BJ ~ College - a campus he had visited several times. The Kelly Barnes Dam on Toccoa Creek dated back to 1899, when a rock-and- timber structure was built across a fast-flowing mountain stream to impound water for a small hydroelectric plant. Later, Toccoa Falls Bible Institute chose the valley below as the site for its campus, took over the power plant and, in 1937, decid\ld to construct an earthen embankment over the original dam, 'eventually raising the structure's height to, 42 feet. Twenty years later, in 1957, the school abandoned the power plant. For the next two decades, the dam was neglected, visited only by an occasional fisherman or hiker. Pine trees grew to maturity on its downstream slope, sending roots deep into the dam's core. Portions of the steep embankment vanished in a landslide, but there were no repairs, even though water seeped almost continuously from the base oj the dam. Finally, the weakened 78-year-old dam collapsed during a rainy night in Georgia: In the valley below, Eldon Elsberry and two friends were on patrol in the campus fire department's Jeep. When the wall of water hit, it overturned the vehicle. "One minute the water [in the creek] was inches deep, and the next I was swimming for my life," Mr. Elsberry said. "I saw the bank and made for it." He turned and saw"one of his friends struggling in the water. "I reached'for his hand. He went by so fast I couldn't touch him." Experts later calculated that the water released by th_e dam's collapse weighed approximately the same as 7,500 locomotives. As the water crashed across the campus, it destroyed a dormitory and crushed a cluster of mobile homes where married students lived, Later, in the mud and tangled debris, 39 bodies were found. Twenty were children. College officials said they never hired a private consulting engineerbecause they had no idea it had safety problems. The state of Georgia never inspected the dam because, at the.time, there was no state law reqUiring such inspections. Few other states had dam safety laws then, either. Pennsylvania was one of the exceptions. Its tough law was spurred by memories of the 1889 collapse of South Fork Dam above Johnstown that killed 2,209 people. Yeteveri with the strong state law requiring regular safety inspections, another 55 people in the same community died in July 1977 after the failure of Laurel Run Dam, just a few miles from where South Fork Dam triggered the disaster 88 years earlier. ' While all states except Alabama now have laws or regulations establishing dam safety programs, enforcement is spotty, largely because of the paucity of inspectors. In Texas, for example, there are only six state employees to inspect nearly 7,500 dams. One Texas official noted that with the current staff level "some dams would not be examined for three centuries." Let's do the math. Two of my teenaged grandchildren live in Texas. If we count 30 years for each generation, that means all the dams in Texas will be Inspected by the time my grandchildren's great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-grandchildren ring in a new year in 2306. Reassuring, isn't it? . Gaylord Shaw won a Pulitzer Prize for a series investigating the state of the nation's dams for the Los Angeles Times in 1978. ' JUNE 1999: ONE OF CENTRAL OREGON'S DAMS COULD COLLAPSE IN A MODERATE EARTHQUAKE, prompting federal officials to warn people' immediately below Wickiup Reservoir to flee to higher ground at the first sign 'of ground movement. "If people can feel an earthquake in the area, it's probably going to be strong'enough to do something to the dam," said Larry Wolf, dam safety expert with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation In Boise. It is the first time in the Northwest that the bureau has advised residents to evacD1Dte Received standard practice during an earthquake. "Certainly we don't want to create panic':"b~ we' . " JUN 0 3 2008 24 Planner: BJ ~ ' want people to be aware," he said. The dam is about 20 miles [32 kilometers] south of Bend and much closer to a number of upscale developments, including Sunriver, which can be packed with 20,000 people on a summer day. The bureau estimates that floodwaters could endanger roughly 10,000 people. However, Wolf said there would be time for most people to evacuate. The flooded area would roughly follow the channel of the Deschutes River, extending beyond the banks for more than a mile in some places, he said. Because the river channel flattens in some developed areas, floodwaters would take about 14 hours to reach Bend, he.said. An earthquake with a magnitude of 5.0 on the Richter scale could cause a catastrophic failure of the 2-mile-long earthen dam. However, he said the chances of such an earthquake are estimated to be about one-tenth of 1 percent each year. Wolf characterized the risk as remote but real. The Klamath Falls earthquakes in 1993 were pegged at magnitudes of 5.6 and 6.0, and the Scotts Mills earthquake earlier that year in the Willamette Valley hit 5.6. Wolf said data'collected at the dam in recent years indicated that the saturated silt and ash layers of earth beneath the dam could liquefy during an earthquake. The dam was completed in 1949 and holds up to 200,000 acre feet of water, or enough water to cover 200,000 acres to a depth of one foot. The water is used primarily for irrigation in Jefferson County. Wolf said reclamation engineers have suspected for years that Wickiup Dam was at risk. Those fears were confirmed with additional analysis and testing last year. In February, the bureau decided it.needed to warn local authorities and the public about the situation and to undertake a $40 rnillion renovation project. Jim Mumford, who heads the bureau's darn safety division in Boise, said these are far more specific warnings than the bureau has ever issued to Pacific Northwest communities. For, example, when the Ochoco Dam near Prineville was at some risk of failing several years ago, the bureau told residents to contact locai emergency'service officials if there was a problem with the dam. But with Wickiup, he said, there won't be time to await instructions from officials. "This is,the first time where we're saying, 'Don't wait for notification. The earthquake is the notification,' " he said. The bureau also has designated escape routes, then posted fliers and sent brochures to area homeowners with maps of those routes. Larry Zakrajsek, who does risk analysis for the bureau, said the agency did not rush to warn people partly because the danger is small and the dam has functioned well for 50 years. By Gordon Gregory, Correspondent, The Oregonian The Spring Break Quake 01'1993, which rattled buildings across western Oregon and caused $30 million in damage, was a harbinger of an 8 or 9 magnitude quake that is in Oregon's future, geologist Donald Hull tells legislators. "It's been 299 years since the last such event," Hull said. "The window of vulnerability is open again." Hull, who is Oregon's chief state geologist, hopes the Legislature will set aside money for better mapping of earthquake hazard zones and for public safety campaigns to let people know what to do wh!3n the Big One hits., The department has been able to retrofit about 60 bridges'since the Spring Break quake, but ODOT estimates that at least 1,500 other bridges in western Oregon are in need of at least some earthquake strengthening. Frank Nelson, ODOT's bridge preservation engineer, said eight more bridge'projects are planned, and that the department might be able to do an additional four if lawmakers approve a gas tax increase for road repairs. Those projects should at least be enough to keep Interstate 5 -- Oregon'smain north-south lifeline -- open in 'the event of a major earthquake, Nelson said. Scientific evidence shows that major offshore earthquakes occur off Oregon's coast once every 350 to 500 years. The last one, in 1700, drowned coastal forests and sent tsunami waves across the Pacific so powerful that they destro'yed Japanese fishing villages. Such a quake would not only devastate Oregon coastal communities, but inland areas as well. "The Willamette Valley is a big trough full of loose soils, gravel, sands and silts," he said. "When earthquake waves trave.1 through that kind of sediment, they get bigger; they arIDatEr Received praYing It won't happen In my lifetime." ; ',' 25 JUN 0 3 2008 Planner: BJ ," , , , Senate President Brady Adams said lawmakers are aware that Oregon is due for another huge earthquake. "It's hard to define in a specific time frame what the risk is. Is it going to happen tomorrow, o'r 200 years from now?" the Grants Pass Republican said. "There's no question the threat of earthquakes is real, but we also knOw we have school funding,and' other needs that are before us today." Hull said he can't argue with that logic, but still thinks the l:egislature should consider increasing at least to a small degree its financial commitment to preparing the state for the Big One. "There's nothing else in our foreseeable future that's going to be as devastating," the state geologist said. "It's not going to do us any good to fund education programs if the school buildings end up falling on kids' heads." fromthe City of Eugene "World's Greatest City of the Arts and Outdoors" website - eugene-oLgov note: the URL for this report is now difficult to find due to the extremely convoluted names for each web page - when the Mitigation Plan was originally posted it was easy to find Eugene's Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan ,This NID (National Inventory of Dams) potential hazard classification is solely a measure of the probable impacts if a dam fails. Thus, a dam classified as High Potential Hazard does not mean that the dam is unsafe or likely to fail. The level of risk (probability of failure) of a given dam is not even considered in this classification scheme. Rather, the High Potential Hazard classification simply means that there are people at risk downstream from the dam in the inundation area, if the dam were to fail. ... Table 12.3 NID High Potential Hazard 'Dams Lane County . L' ICtlunty Dam Name Ri....er City :-lID Height (feet) SID StOmgc (ACIt: feet) I ILane Cottage Grove Coast Fork Willameuc River COTTAGE GROVE 103 50,000 I ILane DC:J;tcr Middle Fork Willamette River EUGENE 117 29,900 I ILon, FallCreck Fall Creek SPR~GFIELD 205 125,000 I ILlUle D=~ Row River COTTAGE GROVE 154 131,000 I lume Lookout Poim Middle Fork Willamctte River EUGENE 276 477,700 I ILane Blue River Dam Blue RivCJ" SPRINGFIELD 312 89.000, I IL"'" HillsCreck Middle Fork Willnmctte River OAKRIDGE 341 356,000 I ILon, ICougar South Fork McKenzie River SPRINGFIELD 519 219.000 I ILon, I Fern Ridge Long Tom River EUGENE 49 121,000 I Of these NID High Potential Hazard dams all except Fern Ridge are upstream from the Eugene/ Springfield Metro Area., Date RecAived JUN 0 3 2008 26 Plannr.:r.r" RJ ~.,~ g , - ,I 12,4 Dam Failure Hazard Assessment: Eugene/Springfield Metro Area " i A 1987 report on DamlLevee.Failureby the Oregon Emergency M::magement Division lists 51 historical dam failures in Oregon from 1896 through the 1980s. As of the time of this report, no dam failure fatalities had been recorded in Oregon. However, the potential for dam failure fatalities certainly exists in Oregon, in Lane County and in the Eugene/Springfield Metro Area, albeit with a low probability of , occurrence. To evaluate the level of risk posed by the dams affecting the Eugene/ Springfield Metro Area, we consider the nine dams iq the NID high potential hazard classification where the potential impacts of failure, including life safety, are greatest. Much smaller dams in the significant and low potential hazard , categories do not pose a life' safety threat and the risk,:of property damage is minimal or low. 12.5.1 Flood Damage to Dams All of the Corps dams were designed and built with specific flood capacities. Current dam designs are based on Standard Project Floods, Standard Project Floods, as defined in the Corps Engineer Manual 1110-2-1411 (March,l, 1965) are floods resulting from the Standard Project Storm. In turn, the Standard Project Storm is defined, somewhat imprecisely, as the most severe flood-producing rainfall-snowmelt, depth-area-duration event that is considered "reasonably' characteristic" of the drainage basin. Discussions with Corps staff in the Portland District Office indicated that the Standard Project Flo,od is approximately a 500- year flood event. The Corp dams' discharge design levels include the combination of spillway discharge capacity and reservoir outlet pipe discharge' capacity. For example, for the Hills Creek Dam, the Standard Project Flood is 64,500 cubic feet per second. The maximum controlled discharge capacity of the dam is 151,760 cubic feet per second, or nearly two and one-half times the Standard Project Flood discharge. These data are included on the Hills Creek Project, Emergency Response Flowchart7, At discharges beyond the maximum controlled discharge capacity of the dam, the dam would be overtopped, discharges would be uncontrolled, and there would be a high probability of damage to the dam, with some potential for dam failure. The large margin of safety in the discharge capacity df the dam suggests that the Hills Creek Dam likely has the capacity to withstand floods at ' least as large as a 1,000 year flood event without expected damage. The other Corps dams have similar margins of flood design safety. 12.5.2 Earthquake Damage to Dams Date Received . JUN 0 3 2008 27 Planner: BJ , , ~ , , All of these dams were designed and built in the 1940s to 1960s. Seismic design .considerations were thus significantly lower than current seismic design considerations. A summary tabulation of. the seismic design basis and inspection history of these dams is given below in Table 12.5 (Corps of Engineers, Portland District Office, March, 2001). Table 12.5 Seismic Design, Evaluation and Inspection Data Corps of Engineers Dams Date of Last Seismic Evaluation Seismic Design Basis Date of Last Perifildic Inspection Darn Original Current !Cottage Grove 1981 None 0.218 1997 I Dexter 1981 0.10 8 0.218 1996 I Fall Crcck 1981 0.10 8 0.21 g 1999 IDorena 1981 none 0.218 1997 lLookout Point 1981 0,10 g 0,21 g 1999 IBlue River 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1996 , IHill> Creek 2000 0.10 g 0.22 g Ii 1999 ICougar 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1997 I Fern Ridge 2001 none 0.35 g 2000 As shown in Table 12.6, the Corps has conducted at least preliminary seismic evaluations of all of these dams. However, some of these evaluations were conducted in the 1980s and thus do not reflect current understanding of the seismic hazard in Oregon or current state-of-the"art seismic eyaluation engineering principles. The Corps has an ongoing regular inspection program and an ongoing seismic evaluation program. Presumably, updated seismic evaluations of these dams will be completed over the next few years. " Seismic considerations were completely absent in the design of two of these " dams: Dorena and Fern Ridge. The others were explicitly designed or probably designed to ground shaking levels of 0.10 g, which is the maximum seismic design level for any of the Corps dams in western Oregon. Incontrast, the current Corps seismic design levels for dams at these sites (i.e., if new dams were to be built today) would be 0.21 g to 0.24g for the dams in eastern Lane County and 0.35 g' for Fern Ridge. Thus, current seismic design requirements are for levels of ground shaking about two times higher than the probable design levels for most of these dams and about three times higher for Fern Ridge. Seismic evaluations of dam safety are a highly technical, highly specialized art. Separate evaluations must be done for each dam. The evaluation requires a detailed , analysis of the design and construction of the dam, an analysis of the currlf\t . condition of materials and components, geotechnical analysis of the found'alate~eCeIVed site, and a site-specific seismic hazard analysis. For emergency planning purposes" 0 3 JUN 2008 28 Planner: BJ ~- a seismic evaluation should include the probabilities of failure for a scenario earthquake such as a large magnitude event on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 12.5.3 Loss Estimates (Preliminary) Detailed loss estimates for possible failures of these dams are beyo~d the scope of this mitigation plan, However, we note that in 1987 the Oregon Emergency , Management Division estimated that a completely catastrophic failure of the Hills Creek Dam, an extremely unlikely event, could require the evacuation of over 250,000 people with damages in excess of$10 billion. Adjusting these 1987 estimates for inflation and for population growth suggests that damages could easily exceed $20 billion. Detailed,casualty estimates have not been made for catastrophic dam failures affecting Lane County. However, given the large ' , inundation areas, high water depths, a'nd the logistical difficulti~s in evacuating 250,000 people to safe ground, it is not.difficult to imagine that a truly catastrophic dam failure could potentially result in 1,000 or more deaths. The probability of catastrophic failure of these dams is impossible to estimate with any accuracy, from present data. Most likely, the probability is less than 0.1 % per year (less than once in 1,000 years, on average) and perhaps substantially less. However, the consequences of failure are so high that careful evaluation is certainly warranted. The potential impacts of dam failures on the Eugene/Springfield Metro Area are summarized below in Table 12.6 Table 12,6 Potential Impacts of Dam Failures on the Eugene/Springfield Me~o Area I Inventory Portion of EugenelSpringfteld Metro Area affected Buildings [Streets within Metro Area IRoads toIfwm Metro Area I Electric power IOtherUtilitieS ICaSualtieS Probable Impacts DireCt impacts limited to mapped inundation areas for dam failures, or to mmller areas' for more likely . . '. 1 partial failures Heavy dlllIWge in inundation areas Damage and closures in inundation areas Damage and closures in inundation areas Damage and loss of service in inundation areas Damage and los5 of service in inundation areas. Potential for major damage to wllter and W'Mlewnter treattnent plants in extreme events Potential for high casualties (deaths and injuries) in extreffiely unlikely major dwn failures, depending on wwnmg time available and effectiveness of evacuations "I Date Received 12,6 Mitigation Strategies JUN 03 2008 29 Planner:. BJ r'.~ Possible dam failures affecting the Eugene/Springfield Metro Area are low probability events, but the potential casualties and economic consequences are extremely high. The combination of low probability but large consequences makes analysis of such situations difficult from both a technical and a public policy perspective. The evaluation is difficult technically because it requires detailed engineering analysis of each dam and careful probabilistic risk analysis. AS,always, communication with the public must be non-alarmist,' but factual, realistic and informative.' , Recommendations , I 1. Because of the age of these dams, the seismic design basis of all of the dams potentially affecting the Eugene/Springfield Metro Area is significantly below current seismic design requirements. Preliminary seismic evaluations have been done but without sufficient detail to evaluate the probabilities of dam failures. . Because of the extreme consequences of potential failure of one or more of these dams, we recommend that detailed seismic evaluations be conducted for all of these dams. All of these dams are owned and operated by the D.S, Army Corps of Engineers. Therefore, pragmatically, the role of the Eugene/Springfield community would be primarily to strongly encourage the Corps of Engineers to complete these urgently required seismic evalu~tions as soon as possible. 2. A key step in mitigation planning for dam safety is emergency planning. l}mergency planners in the Eugene/Springfield Metro Area should ,obtain copies of the inundation maps for each of the major dams to familiarize themselves with the areas of potential flooding. For emergency planning, the estimated flood depths and the time periods from dam failure are particularly important. Flood depths and flood times both vary markedly with distance downstream from the dam locations. For,em'ergency planning, key elements include community emergency notification proced~res and evacuation planning (routes and traffic control). Because oftlIe very large numbers of potential evacuees, training seminars and scenario exercises are strongly recommended. 3. All of these dams have Emergency Action'Plans, These plans should be reviewed to ensure that they are complete and up to date. Emergency planning officials in each county should be fully informed of the detailed consequences of the potential failure of each dam. Public notification and evacuation plans should be updated and tested. For some types of dam failures, for example, th9se due to extreme floods, there may be some warning time, Decision making proced~ R ' ' protocols, and procedures for issuing watches, warnings, and evacuation ndtf~~e ecelved JUN 0 3 2008 30 Planner: BJ I . '~ ' should be reviewed and updated and coordinated among all responsible federal, state, and local agencies: [emphases added] '" Date, Received JUN 0 3 2008 31 Planne'''' ,i";;, Ii .11 r{'"'"l" , ".'"" .=):'~)